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Bodily movement has long been employed as a foundation for cultivating mental skills
such as attention, self-control or mindfulness, with recent studies documenting the
positive impacts of mindful movement training, such as yoga and tai chi. A parallel
“mind-body connection” has also been observed in many developmental disorders. We
elaborate a spectrum of mindfulness by considering ADHD, in which deficient motor
control correlates with impaired (disinhibited) behavioral control contributing to defining
features of excessive distractibility and impulsivity. These data provide evidence for an
important axis of variation for wellbeing, in which skillful cognitive control covaries with a
capacity for skillful movement. We review empirical and theoretical literature on attention,
cognitive control, mind wandering, mindfulness and skill learning, endorsing a model
of skilled attention in which motor plans, attention, and executive goals are seen as
mutually co-defining aspects of skilled behavior that are linked by reciprocal inhibitory
and excitatory connections. Thus, any movement training should engage “higher-order”
inhibition and selection and develop a repertoire of rehearsed procedures that coordinate
goals, attention and motor plans. However, we propose that mindful movement practice
may improve the functional quality of rehearsed procedures, cultivating a transferrable
skill of attention. We adopt Langer’s spectrum of mindful learning that spans from
“mindlessness” to engagement with the details of the present task and contrast this
with the mental attitudes cultivated in standard mindfulness meditation. We particularly
follow Feldenkrais’ suggestion that mindful learning of skills for organizing the body
in movement might transfer to other forms of mental activity. The results of mindful
movement training should be observed in multiple complementary measures, and may
have tremendous potential benefit for individuals with ADHD and other populations.
Keywords: attention, skill, ADHD, cognitive control, inhibition, movement, Feldenkrais, mindfulness
Introduction
A growing body of literature demonstrates that mindful practice of movement can yield
improvements in cognitive and attentional skills in healthy adults, and similarly improve
functioning in ‘‘anomalous’’ development, as with ttention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD; Hernandez-Reif et al., 2001; Balasubramaniam et al., 2013; Converse et al., 2014;
Gard et al., 2014b; Wayne et al., 2014). Moreover, individuals diagnosed with ADHD
exhibit correlations between executive, attentional and motor deficits, providing evidence
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for a shared functional and neural basis (Gilbert et al.,
2011; MacNeil et al., 2011). Existing accounts have
provided candidate cognitive and neural mechanisms for this
‘‘mind–body connection’’ (Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008;
Tang and Posner, 2009; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012; Gard
et al., 2014a), but given that these practices are based on
movement, it is surprising that the role of motor learning
remains underexplored. Following Marr (1982), we argue that
it is critical to organize a neural theory, here of a mind–body
connection, in light of the computational problems being
solved, and the kinds of representations or algorithms that
appear to be employed (see also Wilson and Golonka,
2013). Given the strong evidence for a relationship between
movement skill and attentional and other forms of cognitive
control, we propose that this relationship stems from profound
overlap between the computational problems being solved in
motor learning and executive function. Here we provide a
theoretical view on the applied concern of how movement
learning interventions might improve cognitive functioning
in humans from the ‘‘computational’’ perspective of skill
learning.
We begin with the common observation that attention moves.
Attention moves via movement of the body, involving for
example the eye, the head, or the arm, either in response to
an attractive (exogenous) stimulus or as part of an internal
(endogenous) impulse. While studying attention in isolation
from physical movement has yielded notable progress, multiple
lines of evidence now suggest that the process of controlling
attentional movement cannot be cleanly separated from the
selection of physical movements. Even ‘‘pure’’ covert shifts of
attention, without movement of the sense organ, have been
modeled as a planning state of ocular or striate (body) muscle
movements that are not (yet) executed (Posner, 1980; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2010). This somewhat radical conception
dispenses with the need for distinct neural circuits for motor
planning and spatial attention (but see Smith and Schenk,
2012).
A shared foundation for both sensory and motor function
is reflected in the macro architecture and functioning of the
brain (Anderson, 2010). Both motor planning and attentional
control share a dependency on the same kind of information:
contingencies regarding the structure of the environment,
the body, and how they relate in behavior. Evolutionary and
developmental evidence supports the foundational nature of
sensorimotor coordination in the brain, where the earliest
short-range primary motor-sensory connections are those that
control simple movements, later developing premotor-parietal
connections control more complex motor sequences, and still
later developing long-range connections involving prefrontal
and posterior parietal cortices support more complex or abstract
sensorimotor interactions that may be extended over space
and time (Fuster, 2001). Thus, much of cortical function
may be characterized as a hierarchy of sensorimotor control
that is roughly reflected in the elaboration of frontal (motor,
premotor, prefrontal) and parietal cortices, along with additional
subcortical inputs (cf. Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). We propose
that the effects of mindful movement practices on attention
may be understood within a theoretical framework for the
mind–body connection that situates attentional and executive
control within this sensorimotor hierarchy. Much as motor
decision processes may be the result of reciprocal inhibition
and excitation both within and between cortical representations,
higher-order cognitive processes such as attentional control
or response switching may likewise result from competitive
selection among sensorimotor representations (cf. Smith et al.,
1999; Fuster, 2001; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). We propose that
core shared features across attention and motor control provide
the mechanistic basis for the effects of mindful movement
practices.
Movement illustrates the inseparability of mind and body,
and we propose that the traditionally ‘‘mental’’ phenomena of
executive and attentional control are essentially ‘‘higher-order’’
motor control. MacKay (1982) observed that abstract skills
organize existing procedures into the structure of higher-order
skills. Computationally, if learning takes place under conditions
of variability and uncertainty, these higher-order procedures
will more readily transfer beyond trained contexts (Mitchell,
1997; Bishop, 2007). The results of motor task variation may
be modeled as ‘‘structural’’ learning of those parameters for
control that are shared across tasks (such as cycling and
motorcycling) from those that are specific, resulting in a lower-
dimensional space of common control parameters that foster
transfer of a skill (Braun et al., 2009). A critical distinction is
made between such higher-order skills and ‘‘core’’ or relatively
modular motor control. Core motor control implements motor
intentions while correcting for errors or binding immediate
contingencies (Shadmehr et al., 2010; Wolpert et al., 2011), while
higher-order motor control is described as integrating across
multiple cognitive domains within a hierarchy of abstraction
(Fitts and Posner, 1967; MacKay, 1982; Beilock and Carr, 2004;
Wulf, 2007; Clark and Ivry, 2010) or as emerging from the
interaction between mind and the physical world (Barsalou
et al., 2007; Anderson, 2010). Intrinsic to skilled action is
the deployment of goals and attention, which in well-trained
skills may proceed without explicit intention, effort or even
conscious awareness (for example, as when you mindlessly drive
home in your car, instead of to your intended destination).
Executive goals have been observed as embedded within
hierarchically organized associations and procedures that can
realize the goal (Miller et al., 1960; Baddeley, 1996; cf. ‘‘knowing
how’’ in Cohen and Squire, 1980), or as emergent from the
interaction dynamics of feedback loops in dynamic accounts of
cognition (Kelso, 1997; Scherbaum et al., 2012). The mind–body
connection might thus be viewed as the ubiquity of motor skill
processes across different levels of abstraction, with transfer
being facilitated by structural learning of generalizable control
parameters.
Paradigm ‘‘failures’’ of attentional skill are the phenomenon
of mind wandering and behaviors observed in attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Folk notions of mind
wandering may focus on insufficiencies in the effort to maintain
or return our attention to the sensations and actions relevant
to our desired goals. While external distractions may certainly
attract attention away from longer-term goals, mind wandering
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can also be the result of internally generated ‘‘distractions’’ as
potentially unintended executive goals dominate or inhibit task-
relevant goals (for evidence that goals arise automatically, see
Bargh and Ferguson, 2000). We propose that such competition
between goals might similarly explain aspects of ADHD.
Specifically, impairments in attentional control and response
inhibition—diagnostic features of the disorder—are likely driven
by an inability to regulate competition between task-relevant
and other internally or externally generated goals. There is
strong evidence for impaired temporal discounting in ADHD,
and available data indicate that this is due to dysregulation
as opposed to differences in the perceived value of delayed
rewards (Scheres et al., 2013) such that impaired ability to
maintain focus appears to result from an excessive bias towards
short term rewards that distract from longer term goals. These
behavioral and neurologic findings reveal an ‘‘anomalous’’
pattern of development in ADHD that appears to affect
fundamental mechanisms of cortical selection and inhibition
in both the control of attention and of physical movement
(Aron and Poldrack, 2005; Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008).
Integrating cortical mechanisms of selection and inhibition into
our sensorimotor theory of the skilled control of attention, we
thus speculate that selection and inhibition across goals, attention
and motor plans may be a core feature of both ADHD and mind
wandering.
If implicit or automatic goals are implicated in dysregulated
attention and behavior, they may also be implicated in
mindful attention and behavior. Scholarly descriptions of
mindfulness meditation however, often centrally feature the
element of an intentionally (and initially, effortfully) sustained
mental state, particularly in focused attention (FA) meditation
(e.g., Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Kerr et al., 2013; for a
more inclusive overview, see Vago and Silbersweig, 2012).
MacLean et al. (2010) in particular report improvements in
sustained attention (i.e., likely decreased mind wandering)
in a randomized assessment of intensive meditation training
that included FA as well as other practices. By contrast,
Langer (2000) provides a conception of mindful learning
that is not achieved via effortful focus on a fixed mental
state, but rather by engagement with evolving distinctions
and alternatives as they arise within a context and task. We
argue that mindful movement practice encourages mindful
learning driven by awareness of sensorimotor distinctions
and alternatives. While Langer avoids claims regarding the
domain of meditation, we claim that mindful movement should
expressly not be considered as a variant FA during movement
(this approach is termed ‘‘contemplative movement’’ and is
discussed elsewhere in this issue; Russell and Arcuri, 2015).
We suggest that effort or sustained attention may be less
necessary in training attentional skills via a mindful movement
practice (though they are sometimes used), as sensorimotor
activity may generate conditions for engagement (or ‘‘mindful
presence’’) in learning from within the movement task. The
natural co-occurrence of perceptions and movement may thus
alleviate the problem of investing effort to establish a skill
that one does not yet know how to perform—for example if
the relevant procedural goals and coordination are not yet in
place for the coordination of mindful attention (Feldenkrais,
1972; Kuhl, 2000). Movement reliably generates concretely
observable sensations that can act as suitable feedback to
support the discovery and refinement of relevant action, which
is crucial for the training of both self-regulation and skill
(Kuhl, 2000; Shadmehr et al., 2010; Strehl, 2014). By attending
to movement intentions (i.e., goals) and actual consequences
(i.e., distinctions in the sensation) of movements, value-based
learning may efficiently strengthen or weaken associations
to respective executive procedural representations. Thus, we
propose that mindful movement may train control skills
that can coordinate goals, attention, and motor programs
(Figure 1)—particularly in cases wherein the learner may
struggle in his intentions due to dysregulated mechanisms
of cortical inhibition and selection, as in ADHD or other
developmental challenges.
We suggest that Feldenkrais (1947) pioneered a
‘‘contemplative’’ or ‘‘neurophenomenological’’ (Thompson
et al., 2005) approach of disciplined first-person inquiry and
third-person explanations in his attempt to understand human
development via a neural information processing theory of
movement. As with meditation (Lutz et al., 2007), rigorous first-
person insights from movement practice provided Feldenkrais
with insight and constraints on the kinds of representations
and procedures that must be instantiated in the nervous system.
As such, we will in part rely on the ideas of Feldenkrais as a
starting point for our discussion of the mechanisms of mindful
movement practice below. We thereby do not intend to give
a full account of mindful movement practices, but selectively
evaluate how mindful movement may provide conditions for
learning skills for attentional control. As with other skills, we
propose that skilled control of attention requires inhibitory
and excitatory associations between executive, sensory, and
motoric representations that are coordinated within a repertoire
of procedures. Critically, learning will generally occur in
the context of existing, stable procedures, or ‘‘habits’’ that
arose during development and adult life (Feldenkrais, 1947).
Following Feldenkrais’ suggestion, we focus primarily on
learning via differentiating novel sensorimotor skills within
the landscape of sensorimotor dependencies rather than on the
extinction of existing habits (for a similar view, see Barandiaran
and Di Paolo, 2014; Di Paolo et al., 2014; for an account of
extinction in mindfulness meditation, see Vago and Silbersweig,
2012).
In summary, the theoretical construct of a repertoire of
functional procedures and the rich characterization of stages
and mechanisms of skill learning may be a novel and
constructive application of concepts from the motor skill
literature with broad applicability to more seemingly ‘‘cognitive’’
skills. Given our notion of attentional and executive control
as higher-level skill processes within a sensorimotor network,
we suggest that the exceptionally rich, stable sensory feedback
generated by motor practice provides ideal conditions for
the practitioner to develop skills for improved attentional
and behavioral control. Hence, while our characterization
of attentional and executive skill would imply that mindful
movement practices and meditation target similar ‘‘learning
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic of reciprocal inhibition and selection between
sensory, motor, and executive functions (adapted from Smith et al., 1999).
“Feed-forward” connections from sensory and executive goal representations
(solid blue, left-to-right) are a standard part of even the most simplistic models
of sensorimotor control. More recent connectionist and dynamical systems
approaches highlight that reciprocal connections are the norm throughout the
nervous system (i.e., including dashed orange, right-to-left connections), giving
rise to more complex dynamics. Thus, functions such as “attention” or
“behavioral control” arise via coordinated interactions between evolving
representations (we refer to this coordination as a procedure). The types of
representation depicted here are likely supported by distributed brain networks
and not fully dissociable, and we argue that sensorimotor control activity serves
to coordinate and organize between these networks. (B) Embedding sensory,
motor and executive functions within the sensorimotor loop. Here,
enacting volitional or habitual motor plans continuously generates concrete,
immediate and differentiated sensations via the body and world. These signals
can be compared with states that are desired (via goals) or predicted (via motor
efference). Hence, procedures of skilled coordination of reciprocal mechanisms
of inhibition and selection underlying skilled attention and skilled cognitive
control can be refined directly within the sensorimotor loop. This yields the
profound potential for improvement of selection and inhibition processes, in
particular in populations diagnosed with ADHD where impaired motor
inhibition/selection is a diagnostic feature. Movement figures reprinted with
permission from Russell (2014).
outcomes,’’ movement practice may build executive procedures
within functions of sensorimotor coordination as part of
the movement exploration rather than via a process of FA
meditation. Finally, the domain of movement may provide
not only an effective opportunity for improving the functional
coordination of movements, goals and attention, but also
yield cleanly operationalized measures of improvements in
performance of the trained motor skill—thus being highly
amenable to empiric study.
Our central hypothesis is thus that mindful movement
practice may improve executive and attentional control by
providing opportunities for learning functional coordinations
of goals and attention, and that this might be productively
modeled as skill learning (Table 1). Specifically, learners likely
refine the flexible coordination of inhibitory and excitatory
associations organized within learned action sequences or
procedures. Much as in the practice of other motor skills, learned
attentional or executive skills may initially be ‘‘declarative’’
or ‘‘cognitive,’’ but with practice become proceduralized and
ultimately automatized. At the neural level, we predict that
this will—again, as with other motor skills—be reflected in
rapid changes supported by subcortical structures, followed by
consolidation at the cortical level (primarily in motor, prefrontal
and posterior parietal regions), with a gradual decrease in
prefrontal activation as attentional skill develops (Ungerleider
et al., 2002; Robertson, 2009, provide neural accounts of
motor skill learning) In a mature skill, functional procedures
are automatically and efficiently engaged in appropriate
contexts, which would also be observable as a gradual
reduction in reaction times or reduction in error (Fitts and
Posner, 1967; MacKay, 1982; Beilock and Carr, 2004). In
the limit, however, ‘‘overlearned’’ skills become inflexible,
and transfer to novel contexts is reduced (Karni et al.,
1995; Bapi et al., 2006). While we propose multiple potential
neural mechanisms below (all of which require further
investigation), we also argue from a computational level that
if gains from motor practice are to transfer to classroom
behavior or laboratory tests of attentional control, then
some part of what is learned must remain sufficiently
abstract to apply across these various contexts. Formally, if
higher-order skills are learned under conditions of variability
and uncertainty, this may yield ‘‘structural’’ learning that
facilitates sharing procedures across tasks. Following Marr
(1982) this specification of a computational criterion—here, the
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TABLE 1 | Attentional and cognitive control as coordinated sensorimotor processes.
Process Characteristics Sensorimotor influence Discussion
Cognitive development
(A-not-B error)
Goal fixation via persistent motor
activity
Resolved by external inhibition of motor activity
or by strengthening of sensation
Section: The Developmental
Emergence of Cognitive Control in
Reaching (Smith et al., 1999; Thelen
et al., 2001; Figure 1A)
Mind wandering Decoupling of intended goals (tasks)
leading to wandering thoughts
Created by unintended goals or distracting
sensations
Section: Mind Wandering, Focused
Attention (FA) Meditation and the
Body (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Christoff et al., 2009)
Beginning mindfulness via
body sensation (body scan)
Decoupling of unintended goals
leading to reduced rumination
Achieved by enhanced sensation of the body Section: Mind Wandering, Focused
Attention (FA) Meditation and the Body
(Kerr et al., 2013)
Focused attention
meditation practice
Process of volitional focusing on
intended goal and decoupling from
unintended goal
Achieved by learning efficient (re-) selection of
intended goals via practice of cognitive control
Section: Mind Wandering, Focused
Attention (FA) Meditation and the Body
(Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012)
ADHD Dysregulation of cortical
mechanisms of inhibition and
selection yielding inattention and
impulsivity
Dysregulation plays out across cognitive and
motor behavior; Mindful movement as a basis
for improvement via learning procedural co-
ordination of selection/inhibition
Section: Motor and Cognitive Control
in ADHD (Mostofsky and Simmonds,
2008; Aron and Poldrack, 2005; further
developed in this manuscript)
Mindful movement practice
(e.g., Tai Chi Feldenkrais)
Skilled coordination of goals,
sensations and motor/cognitive
control within structural procedures
Achieved by learning abstract higher-level
coordination skills via mindful learning (sensitivity
to distinctions), fostered by the continuous and
immediate sensorimotor feedback enacted in
movement
Section: Mindful Movement Practice
(developed in this manuscript;
Figures 1B, 2)
Inhibiting muscular
contraction (ATM
“lengthening the
hamstrings”)
Pattern of chronic habitual selection
resulting in muscular contraction
(shortening)
Resolved by an initially pre-conceptual mode of
mindful sensation that derives coherent patterns
of inhibition of habitual musclar contraction,
which later establish co-ordination procedures
via skill learning
Section: Coordinating Physical
Movement: Inhibiting Muscular
Contraction (Stephens et al.,
2006; example ATM provided in
Supplementary Video 1)
Coordinating attention:
motoric mind wandering
(ATM “flex hand to stand”)
Decoupling from intended
movement via absorption of
control and attention in a secondary
movement
(1) Sensing sensorimotor relations and goal
deviations; (2) practice of goal-maintenance via
initially cognitive co-ordination; (3) eventually
establishing skilled goal-maintenance via
procedural co-ordination of attention via skill
learning; (4) continued practice over a large
variety of movement contexts may lead to
transferable skills for goal-maintenance
Section: Coordinating Attention:
Motoric Mind Wandering as a Context
for Practice (formally introduced in
this manuscript; Figure 1B; stills of
example ATM in Figures 3A,B, entire
ATM in Supplementary Video 2 and
Supplementary Video 3).
structural learning of abstract, transferrable skills for attention
and goal-based executive control—is a critically important
(though often underdeveloped) component of our theory of
attentional skill.
A Motor Perspective on Attention and
Self-Regulation
Below, we present evidence from normal development and skill
learning for a conception of attention and executive control
emerging as coordinated activity across sensorimotor networks.
We selectively review premotor theories of attention, which
relate attention control to coordination via biased competition
processes within movement planning. We then summarize
integrative dynamical systems explanations of (impaired)
cognitive control in Piaget’s classical A-not-B error, which
similarly relate competition processes in sensory and motor
activity constitutively to cognitive content and goals. We finally
apply the notion of control as sensorimotor competition to
outline a sensorimotor theory of executive function for mind
wandering and mindfulness.
In the section Motor and Cognitive Control in ADHD,
we will apply our sensorimotor competition perspective on
control to the co-occurring motor and cognitive control
impairments observed in ADHD. In particular, we will
incorporate evidence that points to a general dysregulation
in mechanisms of inhibition and selection. In the final
section Mindful Movement Practice, we provide some initial
suggestions for applying and testing our hypotheses. The
structure of proposed interventions are mainly drawn from
the Feldenkrais method of mindful movement and Langer’s
mindful learning. We propose that mindful movement practices
provide conditions for learning a skilled coordination of
goals, attention and actions with specific transfer to challenges
such as inhibiting unwanted actions or detecting mind
wandering.
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Attention is Closely Linked to Movement
Natural shifts of attention to a large degree occur through
movement, in particular via overt whole-body movements
of gaze including eye-, head and body (Land and Hayhoe,
2001; Schumann et al., 2008; ’t Hart et al., 2009). On the
one hand, attention can move automatically and transiently
between places in the world via exogenous reflexive stimulus-
driven processes, presumably to direct the sense organs to
highly salient aspects and potential danger (Posner, 1980;
Prinzmetal et al., 2005). On the other hand, as organisms
with increasingly complex brains have evolved, their reactions
have become increasingly dominated by ‘‘top-down’’ factors
and a hierarchy of self-established internal goals and models
(Fuster, 2001; Striedter, 2004; Einhäuser et al., 2008). Such
endogenous overt shifts of attention are integral parts of
higher-level motor control schemas that frequently pick up
critical task information at anticipated points of action
(Tatler et al., 2011). Further, following sensorimotor accounts
on perception, endogenous attentional schemas are integral
to perceptual phenomena such as viewing a scene per se
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001), explaining for instance how a
viewer’s active sequential attentive engagement can render
them unaware of major changes in the environment as
demonstrated in inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998)
and change blindness (Rensink et al., 1997; Simons and Rensink,
2005).
Recently proposed premotor theories of attention argue for
a shared motor circuitry between overt and covert attention
equating covert shifts of attention with goal-planning processes
in the premotor system (i.e., movement of focus independent
frommovement of the sense organ). Laboratory tests of attention
often entail covert shifts in attention (as opposed to overt shifts
via gaze movements) that yield enhanced sensory acuity and
reaction times, even for relatively simple tasks (Posner, 1980).
Physiological evidence suggests that such covert attentional shifts
engage the motor planning circuitry of saccades and may be
thought of as planned saccades that are not (yet) executed.
Thus, a ‘‘planning’’ state may selectively enhance processing at
the attended location while raw sensory inputs remain largely
unchanged (for a review, see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2010).
Moreover, these covert shifts are dominated by automatic,
stimulus-driven (exogenous) processes at the shortest latencies,
but over the course of 100 s of milliseconds become dominated
by more abstract and integrative goals and predictions of
expected results (Posner, 1980; Prinzmetal et al., 2005). This
dynamic control of covert attention mirrors the time course
over which sensorimotor coordination comes to be driven not
only by immediate external information but also by internal
goals, memories and integrated models (cf. Smith et al., 2006;
Clark and Ivry, 2010). That is, overt movements and covert
movements of attention appear to engage analogous ‘‘fast’’
and ‘‘slow’’ mechanisms, and moreover, the ‘‘slow’’ modulatory
operations of executive goals and models occur over similar
timescales. While not uncontroversial, even moderate accounts
interpret the available data as a contribution of the motor system
to a biased competition process underlying covert attention
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Treue, 2001; Smith and Schenk,
2012) that is consistent with our proposed sensorimotor model
of a shared neural basis for selection and inhibition in the
control of overt movement, executive control, and control of
attention.
The Developmental Emergence of Cognitive
Control in Reaching
From an embodied sensorimotor perspective, any complex
behavior depends on the interaction of multiple systems and
behavioral difficulties may likewise arise or be addressed
throughout these interacting systems (Wilson and Golonka,
2013). Smith et al. (1999) provide one such example of how
carefully examining a task—here, the A-not-B error (Piaget,
1974) we might interpret a classic developmental ‘‘impairment’’
in cognitive control instead as the result of a dynamic
sensorimotor process. As compared to traditional notions of
cognitive concepts, an embodied view of shared dynamical
systems leads to a novel set of non-conceptual interventions
for an apparently conceptual deficit. Infants appear to gain
stable representations for goal-directed movements (i.e., in
the absence of an immediate perceptual stimulus) around 8-
to 10-months of age—younger infants’ motor systems are
presumably too variable to support such goal representations
(Spencer et al., 2006). Superficially, however, it appears that
infants in this age range are unable to update their concept
of the location of a desired toy. They reach for the old
location A when a toy is moved under their sight to a new
location B (though interestingly, only after a delay of a few
seconds, thus allowing time for a visuo-spatial representation to
decay).
An account that rests on a simple conceptual difficulty,
however, is untenable as children at 7 months already
demonstrate expectations of the correct location in looking time
experiments. Smith et al. (1999) provide an alternative analysis,
demonstrating that changing the motor plans required to reach
for A and B locations—for instance by bringing the child to
stand—eliminates the ‘‘erroneous’’ prepotent impulse to reach
for the incorrect location A. Similarly, also enhancing infants’
attention to their own arms—for instance with wrist weights, and
gold lamé sleeves—eliminates reaches to the incorrect location A
(Thelen et al., 2001). By contrast, increasing the complexity of
the reaching movement can generate reaching to the incorrect
location even in older children and establish analogous reach
biases in adults (Wilson and Golonka, 2013). That is, through
the alteration of possible motor plans, attention to sensations
of the body, or the modulation of required effort, a seemingly
‘‘conceptual’’ and impenetrable difficulty can be either overcome
or created.
Somewhat in line with the neural models of competitive
goal selection discussed above (Fuster, 2001; Cisek and Kalaska,
2010), the action plan to reach for A may remain active
(likely in premotor cortex), and signals (likely from prefrontal
and posterior parietal cortex) regarding the new location are
insufficient to inhibit the existing action plan and select a
functional action plan prior to the initiation of a reach.
Considering the reciprocal nature of the connections between
motor and prefrontal cortex, Thelen et al. (2001) provide
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an integrative model in which dysregulated motor plans not
only hinder the correct execution of the response, but are a
constitutive part of the cognitive process in which mental events
and bodily movement are ‘‘continuously meshed’’ (Figure 1A).
In this embodied sensorimotor view, the motor interface can
bias the entire sensorimotor network—including goals and
attention—towards a coherent (but incorrect) representation, or
‘‘concept,’’ of the desired object, providing a more complete
explanation for the curious dynamics of the task, and the
ability to correct the error from a variety of interventions
in the infant’s process of reaching. In a sensorimotor model,
attentional and cognitive executive control processes such
as selecting which location to attend and to reach are not
localized in a modular structure, but emerge dynamically
as a co-ordination process among shared resources within
sensorimotor activity (cf. Barsalou et al., 2007). As a corollary,
sensorimotor models predict that attention and executive
control may be improved by sensorimotor interventions. From
the onset of infants’ interaction with the world, there is
a role of movement in the enaction and development of
robust, persistent concepts, i.e., the beginnings of cognitive
control.
Mind Wandering, Focused Attention (FA)
Meditation and the Body
A dysregulation of cognitive and attentional control that is
common to all of us is the phenomenon of mind wandering.
In contrast to the A-not-B error, mind wandering does
not reflect a bias towards a given goal, but a deficiency to
stay with a goal given a possibility for distraction. In mind
wandering, the control of attention is said to decouple from an
explicitly intended primary task, provoking deficits in both task
performance and the accuracy of task-related perception. In
line with models of control as emerging in the co-ordination of
shared sensorimotor resources, mind wandering should not be
viewed as a sudden ‘‘break down’’ of executive control, but rather
as a goal-driven executive process in which other executive goals
such as personal or organismic goals with higher reward become
dominant—which may often be unintended or even implicit
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Such goals are thought to
originate for instance in the default mode network (Christoff
et al., 2009; Cosmelli, 2009; Hasenkamp et al., 2012), but from
a sensorimotor perspective goals likely also result from motor
plans that arise from affordances in the environment (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010).
Mindfulness, in comparison, may be seen as the successful,
functional deployment of attention within a task or activity
(extending Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). One of the more
common (and most widely-studied) mindfulness practices to
focus a wandering mind is FA meditation. In FA meditation,
a central aim is the maintenance of attention on a specified
target (e.g., the breath) in the context of unintended goals that
may attract one’s attention (i.e., distractions). The effects of FA
meditation are increasingly understood, as is the characterization
of neural correlates (Lutz et al., 2007; Kerr et al., 2013; Goyal
et al., 2014; Lippelt et al., 2014), though there is a clear need for
additional randomized trials (Allen et al., 2012).
Recent event-related paradigms have attempted to isolate
distinct functional sub-phases in the dynamics of FA meditation
(Hasenkamp et al., 2012). The first proposed phase of focusing
attention meditation is becoming aware of the wanderings of the
mind, which is an aspect of sensation with correlated activity
in the salience network. This network is involved in error
detection mechanisms in particular within interoceptive and
somatosensory signals. A second phase, shifting attention back
to the intended goal, involves lateral prefrontal cortex and lateral
inferior parietal cortex areas of a task-positive executive network,
highlighting that attentional disengagement, inhibition, is an
aspect of reorienting. A final subphase, sustained focusing on
the target, has been linked to ‘‘active rehearsal’’ in task-positive
executive networks, potentially involving maintenance of the
goal in working memory (D’Esposito, 2007; in Hasenkamp et al.,
2012).
In line with our model of shared sensorimotor resources in
attention and cognitive control, it has been suggested that the
first phase of FA meditation—sensation—may be one reason
why many meditative practices start by directing attention to the
body. Changes in somatosensation (even those driven by shifting
attention in the process of ‘‘actively’’ sitting still) may be easier
to detect than wanderings of abstract thought. Mindful direction
of attention toward or away from sensation in the hand leads
to enhanced ability to modulate alpha activity in somatosensory
cortex, and may actively bias thoughts away from rumination
and towards the present—much as cognitive fixation in the A-
not-B error is addressed by enhanced salience of sensory stimuli
(cf. Kerr et al., 2013). A sensorimotor context may thus provide
greater salience and clarity for the learner in situations where the
basic mechanisms of selection and inhibition are dysregulated, as
in ADHD.
A Model for Skilled Cognitive and Behavioral
Control
We suggest that attentional training in mindful
movement practices such as Tai Chi or Feldenkrais’
Awareness-Through-Movement (ATM; described in the section
Mindful Movement Practice) provides multiple additional
opportunities for sensation as compared to the process of
attending to the body at rest as in a ‘‘body scan.’’ Most
importantly, movement reliably generates concretely observable
changes in body sensations for both the practitioner and the
teacher, thereby providing concrete, differentiated, immediate
and continuous feedback about the processes. Further, the
control of movement also generates ‘‘feed-forward’’ predictions
of sensory consequences (Wolpert et al., 2011) that allow a
concrete sensory comparison between the expected and the
actual sensations resulting from the movement that are used
in error-based or predictive motor learning processes that are
dependent on prefrontal cortex and the cerebellum (Blakemore
et al., 2001; Shadmehr et al., 2010; Alexander and Brown, 2011).
While clearly not all motor learning signals are penetrable to
consciousness, the degree of conscious penetrability of both
types of sensorimotor signals has been related to awareness and
abnormalities in the sensation of the body (Blakemore et al.,
2002). In a movement practice, the processing of these signals
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TABLE 2 | Modes of skill learning (adapted from Wulf, 2007).
Mode Features of movements
Conceptual mode Movements are slow, inconsistent, and inefficient (awkward). Considerable higher-
order activity, fragile under distraction. Possibility to develop novel associations and
procedures.
Associative mode (transferrable structures,
abstract representations)
Flexible application of learned associations and procedures.
Autonomous mode (motor coding, not directly
accessible to consciousness)
Fast, efficient execution in learned contexts (decreasing transfer). Attention can make
performance worse (cf. Choking).
These “modes” are often presented as “phases.” The switch in terminology is meant to suggest that this may not be a strict or one-way progression.
may be modified by attentional focus, and the practitioner may
also become aware by distinguishing sensorimotor sensations
via mindful comparison (Feldenkrais, 1972; cf. Langer, 2000)
between expected and unexpected sensations accompanying her
actual movement, leading to a refinement of coordination and
body awareness (Figure 1B).
If beyond sensation during movement, we further consider
mindfulness training within the classic three-stage motor
skill learning model proposed by (Fitts and Posner, 1967;
Table 2), all three sub-phases in the above description of
meditative mindfulness via FA are reminiscent of the first
‘‘declarative’’ or ‘‘conceptual’’ stage of classical (motor) skill
learning. In this phase, enhancing sensation by attending
to the body may provide clearer feedback signals during
trial and error learning. Once trial and error learning has
established a sufficient procedural repertoire for the task,
however, skill learning enters a second ‘‘associative’’ phase
in which the new repertoire is practiced and refined until
the sensorimotor associations gain robustness to interference.
Frequently distracting aspects become associated with the
underlying goals and are directly inhibited as part of the skillful
selection of appropriate procedures, until in a last autonomic
phase, no apparent interference can be observed (Fitts and
Posner, 1967). Continued attention to sensory experiences of
the present movement during these later phases of practice may
enhance the selection, refinement, and increasing automaticity of
initial sensorimotor associations. Specifically, learned procedural
knowledge about that task may allow attention to better
distinguish errors and distraction from task-relevant features,
including strategies for transfer and adaptation to novel contexts
(Langer, 2000).
Consistent with an associative learning of procedures in
later stages of skill learning, experienced meditators show less
activity in motor related areas (including SMA and cerebellum)
during the shifting phase, implying more efficient neural
inhibition and selection, along with an increase in resting-
state connectivity within the executive network (including
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices) that is implied in attentional
disengagement and inhibition (Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Similar decreases in the engagement
of attentional networks have been observed in experienced
meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). This pattern of
results may indicate a practice effect in a generic capacity for
disengagement in which a well-learned shifting requires less
neuronal activity—for example via generic enhanced prefrontal
and premotor connectivity, along with subcortical structures, for
example in the cerebellum (Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012).
However, in the motor learning literature, it has been suggested
that spontaneous resting state activity following the practice of
a skill is influenced in specific ways related to functional activity
in the practice of the skill, contributing to the consolidation of
procedural memory (Miall and Robertson, 2006; Albert et al.,
2009; Taubert et al., 2011; Vahdat et al., 2011). Hence, from a
skill perspective, resting state connectivity increases following FA
meditation training may also be explainable by procedure-specific
connectivity that encodes an elaborated repertoire of task-
relevant contingencies between goals, the required actions, and
the accompanying sensations (e.g., mindfulness of how to
exploit the available degrees of freedom to maintain breathing
while organizing complex actions with the body). In the
motor domain, learning would comprise an elaborated set of
possible actions more finely-discriminated to sensory contexts
that give rise to the motor skill. Importantly, structural,
abstract procedural representations may transfer between the
learning contexts and contexts with a similar structure (Braun
et al., 2009; Shadmehr et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2014). We
propose that mindful movement training could similarly yield
an enhanced repertoire of attentional contingencies (that, for
example, allow one to maintain attention amidst distractions)
and indeed, a structural sensorimotor repertoire (per Braun
et al., 2009) may directly underlie aspects of skillful control of
attention.
Both capacity and procedural theories suggest alternative,
testable predictions for gains in attentional skill. On the
capacity account, one would expect broad similarity across
tasks that require efficient operation of trained networks—for
example any motor behavior or control of attention featuring
prefrontal motor and premotor cortices. Over the course of
skill acquisition, one would expect a general reduction, for
example, in prefrontal activity as efficiency increased. On the
procedural account, however, one would expect a larger role of
task specifics, in which transfer to novel (but related) activities
may require additional variational training and structural
sensorimotor representations or internally generated ‘‘contexts’’
(e.g., specific mental states). In this case, well-learned structures
or contexts might yield less activity throughout prefrontal and
motor networks, while structurally novel tasks elicited greater
activity.
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In summary, multiple lines of evidence support our
consideration of attention and control in the context of
motor skill learning. Below, we will see that local inhibitory
mechanisms within motor cortex are diminished in ADHD,
suggesting an impairment that spans the hierarchy of neural
selection and inhibition elaborated above (cf. Fuster, 2001;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Indeed, Thelen et al. (2001)
demonstrate how the activation of motor plans appears to
modulate cognitive flexibility in the A-not-B error. Hence,
multiple brain regions and cognitive capacities are likely relevant
even in basic cognitive tasks via reciprocal inhibition and
selection. Smallwood and Schooler (2006) suggest that even
‘‘undesired’’ shifts of attention may be considered not so
much as away from an intended focus, but rather as shifts
towards novel executive goals that may be either explicit
but also implicit. While such shifts may be counteracted via
effortful, executive processes of selection and inhibition, we
suggest that in skillful performance, goals, motor plans, and
attention will flow more automatically within well-learned and
well-structured functional procedures that entail knowledge
of how to maintain attention and goals under distractions.
Hence, we suggest that while a generic capacity model may
explain improvements in attention, a skill-based model in
which specific associations are strengthened in the context of
functional procedures is a compelling alternative model. This
unified model comprises neural processes across basic motor
actions and high-level cognitive skills as well as functional
skill learning principles, suggesting a profound potential for
successful improvements in cognitive function via mindful
movement practice (Table 1).
Motor and Cognitive Control in ADHD
The first empirical test of our theory is currently underway,
in which we are applying a battery of motoric and cognitive
assessments to children with ADHD before, during and after
a mindful movement practice (in this case, tai chi). ADHD is
clinically relevant and also provides an interesting mirror for the
difficulties encountered in FAmeditation (Zylowska et al., 2009).
Consider the difficulties that beginning meditators have with
mind wandering—maintaining an attentional focus that wanders
on its own—and also with sitting still. For most, sustaining
FA and sitting still does not occur without effort—specifically
effortful inhibition of movements or attentional shifts (cf.
Kahneman, 1973), and when this fails, effortful re-selection
of the desired state. As elaborated above, most individuals
appear to have difficulties maintaining an ideal balance between
goals that serve one’s long-term interests vs. goals triggered by
novel or immediately attractive stimuli. One could characterize
the challenges in ADHD as difficulty with sustaining a
task with little immediate reward, or with resisting a novel
impulse (Aron and Poldrack, 2005). These difficulties might
be addressed by enhancing one’s ability to sustain engagement
in ‘‘important’’ tasks (e.g., tasks with substantial long-term
rewards).
Following our treatment of mind wandering above, we
likewise propose that ADHD symptoms my result from
dysregulated inhibition and selection within a network of
sensations, goals and motor plans. This dysregulation might
make it particularly difficult to learn functional attentional
associations and procedures (in addition to analogous behavioral
difficulties). As such, motor practice that automatically elicits
mechanisms of selection and inhibition may be more accessible
to this population than more effortful and difficult practices.
Features of ADHD may further elucidate relationships between
cognitive inhibition and behavioral inhibition, which are difficult
to observe in the general population (Kipp, 2005), potentially
informing effective skill training approaches for improving
cognitive skills for ADHD and in the broader population.
The Significance of ADHD: Motor Control,
Attention, and Cognitive Control
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is the most
common childhood behavioral diagnosis, affecting 3% to 6% of
children throughout the world (Tannock, 1998; Brown et al.,
2001). For a child with an ADHD diagnosis, significantly worse
educational, social, and occupational outcomes are predicted
(Mannuzza et al., 2008), as are higher medical costs in childhood
(Ray et al., 2006). It is well-known that these children exhibit
difficulties in cognitive and emotional regulation (Hinshaw,
2003; Cuffe et al., 2005). As we will see below, however,
there are also clear motor control abnormalities that are
well-correlated with the diagnostic features of ADHD. These
motoric abnormalities may be central to our understanding and
treatment for this diagnosis.
The NIMH maintains ‘‘Research Domain Criteria’’ (RDoC)
for diagnosis and treatment in mental health contexts. This
RDoC approach consists of a set of cognitive domains, with
the goal of linking laboratory cognitive science with research
and innovation in treatments (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). In
the case of ADHD, difficulties with response inhibition and
selection are highlighted in the central capacities of attentional
and cognitive control (often subsumed under the term ‘‘executive
function; Aron and Poldrack, 2005; Mostofsky and Simmonds,
2008). Interestingly, these measures are similarly predictive
of life outcomes in the broader population, including school
performance, income, and mortality (Diamond et al., 2007;
Moffitt et al., 2011).
ADHD is generally treated as a cognitive problem, but
the poor outcomes that persist even after intensive treatment
argue that other perspectives may be warranted (in particular,
movement-based approaches may provide a particularly useful
perspective). Cognitive evaluations of both psychotherapeutic
and pharmacologic treatments primarily assess patients’
executive abilities to maintain attention in the presence of
distractions, to organize tasks, to inhibit impulsive responses
to emotionally salient environmental stimuli, and to prioritize
goals in response to reward. The most comprehensive NIH
funded study of treatment of ADHD to date is the multimodal
treatment of ADHD study (MTA Cooperative Group, 2004). In
this 4-arm treatment study, children in the active 3 treatment
arms received care that far surpasses in intensity the treatment
routinely provided in the community (the active comparator
arm). Short-term reductions in core ADHD symptoms were
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observed with psychostimulants, behavioral treatments, and a
combination of both. Despite this, and surprisingly, at 8-year
follow up, individuals in all treatment arms showed the same
high rates of psychiatric hospitalizations, traffic citations,
illicit drug use, and arrests. The poor long-term outcome
of current therapies highlights the potential impact of novel
treatments.
Motor Impairment is a Core Feature of ADHD
The co-morbidity of motoric and cognitive difficulties in ADHD
point towards shared mechanisms and skills that may underlie
correlations in these measures. Thus, while motor features of
the disorder may not have as much direct impact on quality of
life, they may clarify core features of ADHD, and in particular
lead to refinements in movement-based practices with already-
demonstrated benefits (Hernandez-Reif et al., 2001; Jensen and
Kenny, 2004; Balasubramaniam et al., 2013; Converse et al.,
2014).
Overt Motor Behavior in ADHD
It has long been observed that children with ADHD demonstrate
impairments in motor control that parallel impairments in
cognitive and behavioral control (Denckla and Rudel, 1978;
Kadesjö and Gillberg, 1998; Piek et al., 1999). Studies consistently
reveal extremely high rates (50% and above) of comorbid
Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) in children with
ADHD (Kadesjö and Gillberg, 2001), in particular, impairments
in motor inhibition and selection correlate with the deficits in
attention and cognitive control that define the disorder (Gilbert
et al., 2011; MacNeil et al., 2011), and measures of automatic and
intentional motor inhibition are likewise correlated (Mostofsky
et al., 2003). In studies of specific overt motor signs, investigators
have consistently found children with ADHD show excessive
motor overflow (Denckla and Rudel, 1978; Szatmari and Taylor,
1984; Waber et al., 1985; Mostofsky et al., 2003; Cole et al.,
2008; MacNeil et al., 2011), and impaired motor response
control (Mostofsky et al., 2003; Mahone et al., 2006), as well
as general findings of impaired motor coordination (Denckla
and Rudel, 1978; Piek et al., 1999; Kadesjö and Gillberg, 2001;
Mostofsky et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2008). Children with ADHD
also demonstrate motor impersistence reflective of broader
impairments in maintaining on-task behavior (Mahone et al.,
2006).
In an attempt to understand the core features of these
motor irregularities, we consider here the relatively automatic
phenomenon of motor overflow, for instance mirror overflow
movements. In typical development, mirror movements are
observed, as in unintended movements in the left hand when
intentionally moving the right. This overflow can be elicited
in controlled laboratory settings, and will diminish as a
child’s capacity for motor inhibition (and with that, selection)
improves during development. Even as adults we may experience
occasional mirror overflow (e.g., activity in the lips or hands),
as when focusing intently on a precise task. Elevated overflow
is revealed consistently in children with ADHD across a range
of studies using a variety of methodologies to quantify motor
overflow movements (Mostofsky et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2008;
MacNeil et al., 2011). Furthermore, among children with ADHD,
increased levels of motor overflow correlate with measures of
impaired cognitive control (Mostofsky et al., 2003).
Neurologic Irregularities in ADHD
Multiple lines of research have clarified a brain network of
regions spanning basic motor control, higher-level executive and
subcortical structures that are implicated in response inhibition,
and to some extent, in the pathophysiology of ADHD. The
unifying feature of this network appears to be participation
in the inhibition and selection of behaviors—ranging from
simple movements to abstract, higher-order procedures. The
right Inferior Frontal Cortex (IFC), for example, appears to be
central to behavioral control in the Go/No-go and Stop-signal
tasks, and moreover has a reduced volume in ADHD (Aron
and Poldrack, 2005). The Supplementary Motor Complex (SMC;
in particular the most rostral aspect, the pre-SMA) additionally
plays a central role in response preparation, selection, and
execution and exhibits decreased volume in ADHD. This role
of the pre-SMA is unlikely to be a mere downstream effect of
prefrontal activity, as Isoda and Hikosaka (2007) demonstrate
facilitation of response switching via direct stimulation of pre-
SMA in rhesus monkeys. Some neurons within this region
were found to be specifically responsive to cues signifying
‘‘go’’ (selection/initiation), while others selectively responded to
‘‘no-go’’ cues (inhibition). Cisek and Kalaska (2010) likewise
summarize electrophysiological findings pointing to dorsal
premotor cortex as a primary locus of action selection under
natural conditions, and this region is again reduced in volume
in ADHD (Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008). Thus, it seems
that individuals with ADHD have pervasive neurologic deficits
relevant to behavioral control that span basic sensorimotor
associations, coordination of multiple competing motor plans,
and higher-level inhibition and selection (see Mostofsky and
Simmonds, 2008, for an overview).
Neural correlates of impaired response inhibition in ADHD
have also been observed with basic and unconscious control of
actions generated at the level of primary motor cortex (M1) via
the phenomenon of Short Interval Intra-Cortical Inhibition (SICI;
Kujirai et al., 1993), a modulation of the electromyographic
(EMG) activity that would normally be elicited by a TMS pulse
over M1. The SICI phenomenon is obtained by applying a
conditioning pulse followed by a second ‘‘paired’’ pulse delivered
3 msec later, and this second pulse will elicit reduced EMG
activity compared to a single-pulse baseline. This mechanism
is understood to be the result of GABAergic motor inhibition
in the local network. As described above, children with
ADHD exhibit decreased inhibitory control of movement, and
this is further reflected in the observation that SICI is also
significantly reduced in children with ADHD. Importantly,
this reduced SICI (higher ratios) robustly correlates with
ADHD symptom severity (measured using the Conners teacher
survey). Further strengthening this linkage, psychopharmaca
for cognitive symptoms address motor symptoms as well: two
studies of stimulant (methylphenidate) effects on SICI revealed
enhanced inhibition of approximately 10% and 20%, respectively
(Moll et al., 2000; Buchmann et al., 2007).
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Treating ADHD
As discussed above, poor long-term outcomes are observed
in ADHD even with intensive treatment. If the difficulties
in ADHD are indeed based on a need to develop skills,
this would be unsurprising – there is likewise no pill or
conversation that can lead to the skill required to ride a bike. The
behavioral, imaging, and electrophysiologic evidence reviewed
above indicate that ADHD is associated with impairments in
control of not only complex executive functions, but also basic
motor actions. Parallel, and even correlated, impairments in
inhibitory control are observed across motor, premotor and
prefrontal systems. These structural and functional neuromotor
irregularities in children with ADHD point not only to an
explanation for dysregulated movement, but more generally
to dysregulated mechanisms of inhibition and selection that
may similarly underlie difficulties with both learning and
performance of cognitive skills like the context-appropriate
maintenance of attention. These findings are consistent with our
model developed above (Table 1, section A Model for Skilled
Cognitive and Behavioral Control) in which inhibition and
selection of executive goals or attentional focus are an intrinsic
part of the motor skill repertoire. While our model demands
further validation, below we review current data indicating that
movement training may provide an opportunity to practice and
improve skills that are deficient in ADHD, potentially providing
similar benefits to the general population (as in the case of
mind-wandering).
Mindful Movement Practice
As discussed below, movement instruction provides a
context—by verbal instruction, guidance via touch or physical
environment—which helps the participant to explore and
perceive functional sensorimotor relations in more detail and
from different perspectives. Movement itself continuously
provides concrete, immediate and differentiated feedback about
the process of practice (Figure 1B). In this feedback, a student,
for example, can observe ‘‘invariance, i.e., different ways of
moving that produce or prevent a certain outcome. Gains
in attentional, executive, and behavioral control have been
observed in adults engaged in mindful movement training,
such as tai chi (Miller and Taylor-Piliae, 2014; Wayne et al.,
2014; Wei et al., 2014), yoga (Balasubramaniam et al., 2013;
Gard et al., 2014b), and dance (Kattenstroth et al., 2013).
Improvements in cognitive control symptoms for young adult
and pediatric ADHD populations have also been observed
with tai chi (Hernandez-Reif et al., 2001; Converse et al., 2014)
and also Yoga (Jensen and Kenny, 2004). These results should
be interpreted with caution, as none of the interventions for
cited for ADHD were randomized trials (though reviews above
do include such trials). Likewise, body-based mindfulness
training in children has yielded teacher-reported gains in
attention and concentration in 4th and 7th graders, and
improvements on the flanker task in preschoolers (Zelazo and
Lyons, 2012).
Following our model of skilled control of attention, our
central hypothesis is that long-term practice of mindful
movement may train the ability to continuously monitor
movement, register deviations and update structural motor
procedures that guide or maintain attention within movement.
Much as with the accounts of skill learning and FA meditation
described above, such continuous monitoring will likely initially
yield enhanced prefrontal and premotor activity as novel
coordinations are learned and competing motor programs are
resolved. Appropriate practicemay lead to increasedmindfulness
(or awareness) when a skilled deployment of attention reaches
the autonomous and automatic phase described in skill learning
models in the motor domain. At this stage, overall differences
in, e.g., fMRI signal from a naïve baseline may be difficult
to detect (for example, enhanced prefrontal activity during
behavioral or attentional control may drop with automatization).
However, we would expect that more robust neural selection
and inhibition may be detectable via measures such as TMS
SICI (which is deficient in ADHD, as described in section
Neurologic Irregularities in ADHD). Overall, it will be critical
to assess the effects of mindful movement training throughout
the timecourse of learning, using both behavioral and neural
measures.
Feldenkrais (1947) was among the first to articulate an
argument founded in neural information processing that a
general skill of awareness and improved behavioral control
can be developed via mindful movement training. Feldenkrais
developed his movement practice in dialog with a number of
leading neuroscientists of his time, such that his theoretical
model is informed by basic neuroscientific principles from
the historical context ranging from the 1950’s to the 1970’s.
His approach was also informed by his extensive first-person
experience in movement, in particular as a Judo master
(Feldenkrais, 2010). A particularly clear definition of Feldenkrais’
conception of ‘‘awareness’’ (his preferred term for mindfulness)
was stated as ‘‘a process of full concentration, a process of clear
analytic action on the points you deal with at that particular
moment... involving a real use of an operational procedure’’
(Feldenkrais, 2010, 165). This conception is consistent with
our model that situates attention and executive function within
refined sensorimotor associations and procedures. Feldenkrais’
movement lessons, termed ‘‘Awareness Through Movement,’’1
or ATM (Feldenkrais, 1947, 1972, 1981; Sheets-Johnstone,
1979; Buchanan, 2012) provide the nervous system with
information about coordinating the body during action. During
the complexities of human body movement, higher-level motor
control provides an integrative mechanism of sensorimotor
planning, error detection and decision-making. The critical
role of mindfulness in learning and training—particularly for
transfer—has since been discussed even in the development of
abstract skills, such as computer programming (Salomon and
Globerson, 1987; Langer, 2000). Admittedly, however, evidence
for the efficacy of ATM is currently provisional (Buchanan,
1What is today know as the Feldenkrais Method consists of movement
lessons conducted with groups by verbal instructions for movement,
called ‘‘Awareness Through Movement,’’ as well as individual hands-on
explorations including manual touch called ‘‘Functional Integration.’’ We
focus on the verbal movement instruction approach within this paper.
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2012; Hillier and Worley, 2015).2 Thus, we primarily take the
ideas of Feldenkrais (and also others) as a starting point for
our model of mindful movement. We nonetheless propose that
mindfulness may be a powerful tool for structural learning
that yields transferrable, higher-order procedures, and that
movement is an efficient and convenient domain for such
training.
Mindful Motor Skill Practice
Langer notes that ‘‘[b]eing mindful is the simple act of drawing
novel distinctions. It leads us to greater sensitivity to context
and perspective, and ultimately to greater control over our lives’’
(Langer, 2000, 220). Langer’s (2000) experiments suggest that this
ability to sense discriminations allows for a mode of mindfulness
grounded in flexible application of what is learned to the present
situation or domain. When relevant distinctions go unnoticed,
we are instead influenced by habitual responses and impulses
that do not match the situation. A ‘‘mindless’’ state can thus
result from a fixed and inflexible set of behavioral rules and
factual knowledge that are inappropriate to the current task,
or in other words, mindlessness may result from inappropriate
mental focus. Conversely, drawing novel discriminations while
being attentive to context, to variation and to perspective
during learning appears to establish a mindset that is attentive
to possible differences, leading to mindful awareness. In the
context of our skill learning model, this mindset may prohibit
overlearning—using contextual variation to force a level of
abstraction in what is learned that is necessary for effective
transfer to novel domains. How one learns seems as important
as what one learns (Langer, 2000).
Feldenkrais argued that if the mind is grounded in the
control of movement, learning to improve the quality of
movement is an effective way of acquiring or developing
general principles of learning. In particular, he made use
of sensory discrimination for becoming aware of different
ways of sensorimotor actions (for instance the movements
involved in breathing freely, or in maintaining posture in
gravity against a support surface, in turning the head or the
body for orientation) in a form of learning that ‘‘. . . leads
to new and different ways of doing things [one] already
knows how to do [such as breathing or turning]. This kind
of learning increases [one’s] ability to choose more freely.
Having only a single mode of action means [one’s] choice is
limited to simply acting or not acting’’ (Feldenkrais, 1981, 35).
While ATM lessons are practiced in movements, Feldenkrais
argued that improvement in how one ‘‘directs oneself’’ while
moving—cognitive control—is more important than the actual
movement that is performed (Feldenkrais, 1981, 36). Hence
a primary goal of his approach is that students may use the
medium of movement for learning to direct their goals and
attention, ultimately leading to better skills for ‘‘learning to
2We are currently working with practitioners to make unpublished materials
available. One such example is provided in the Supplementary Video 4.
There, range of movement videos are taken before and after a one-week
Feldenkrais intervention. An illustrative frame from Video 4 is provided in
Figure 3C.
learn’’ (i.e., for mindful learning), and not merely the ability to
maintain FA.
Guiding Awareness to Sensory Details
Feldenkrais worked from the supposition that movement
coordination can be improved by providing relevant sensory
information to the nervous system that differentiates functional
components of action, either within the body (such as
kinematic links between body parts), to the world (such as
kinematic links to support surfaces), or within the central
nervous system (e.g., the scope of the available repertoire of
motor procedures). Two main assumptions are that movement
organization is (partially) constituted by structural sensorimotor
knowledge (e.g., the movements in which a force in standing
or walking travels from the feet through the body), and
that individuals can sense novel functional differentiations of
these relations, leading to a more effective organization of
actions. Both assumptions are in line with theoretical work on
motor learning (Bernstein, 1996; Körding and Wolpert, 2006;
Connors et al., 2010; Wolpert et al., 2011). First neuronal
evidence is found in an fMRI study of a sensorimotor
manipulation based on Feldenkrais principles. Here, an attempt
to differentiate possible relations of the feet to the body
engaged action-related neural processes, accompanied by the
subjective experience of naïve participants of an ‘‘easier’’, ‘‘more
controlled’’ usage of the leg in pushing or standing, and
being ‘‘more stable, better able to keep balance’’ (Verrel et al.,
2015).
ATM lessons attempt to guide students to notice subtle
distinctions between movements, a process which is aided
by instructing the use of slow, small-magnitude movements
performed under minimal effort. Lessons often begin in a supine
position on the floor so that movement sensations can be
experienced with minimal muscular tone and associated anti-
gravity control patterns that are engaged in standing. Reduction
of muscular effort, following a fundamental psychophysical
principle in which reduction in total sensation results in smaller
‘‘Just Noticeable Differences’’ (as developed by Weber and
Fechner; Murray, 1993), improves the thresholds of kinesthetic
sensations and hence their acuity. For this reason, one cross-
cutting ‘‘learning to learn’’ aim of ATM lessons is to develop
students’ procedural knowledge of how to reduce the overall
effort in action in general to allow finer distinctions in sensation
(Feldenkrais, 1972). This is achieved for instance by the
instruction to sense the onset of effort in a movement, e.g., lifting
the shoulder, and then to reduce the extension of the movement
to a range where it can be performed without effort, or by the
instruction to sense secondary signals such as contractions or
relaxation of the face or jaw that are often accompanied with
effort as a feedback signal to distinguish effortful and effortless
ways of moving.
Verbal instructions regarding the direction of attention
during thesemovements aid in distinguishing useful components
of action (e.g., widening of the chest in multiple directions
while breathing) from often unnoticed habitual components
(e.g., habitual raising of the right shoulder with each inhale) that
do not serve the movement task one intended (though these
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FIGURE 2 | Mindful movement practices afford a large variability of
tasks and engage in active, exploratory learning. Movement
variability and exploration induces structural learning of what is common
between two tasks (such as between cycling and motor cycling or
between different movement lessons). Structural generalization of skills
skills fosters transfer to novel domains. Depicted is a small subset of
starting positions of the over 600 classical ATM lessons (matrix in the
upper right corner) developed by Feldenkrais, exploring different
movement themes over a broad variety of movement contexts. Similarly
large numbers of structural movement variations are provided by
traditional practices such as tai chi. Figure adapted with permission from
Russell (2014).
habits would likely have functional use in other movements, here
e.g. for breathing while reaching with the arm).
Many disciplines include attentional instructions, for example
to attend to the breath, or to focus on remaining balanced. The
instructions in an ATM lesson direct attention to sensorimotor
features in a broader variety of specific processes with a clearly
describable target (e.g., attending to a particular movement of
the head), though the details of the attended target may be
difficult to convey in verbal language given the large number
of degrees of freedom in the body. Similar difficulties are
observed when asking an observer verbally about specific features
of multidimensional stimuli in psychophysics (Ehrenstein and
Ehrenstein, 1999). ATM lessons apply the psychophysical
method of comparison, in which critical features are rendered
salient in sensation via comparison between two stimuli, to
mindful practice. Verbal attention instructions in ATM often
prompt for directing attention directly within the sensorimotor
space by comparisons between concrete sensations (for instance
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asking the student to observe changes in the contact areas of
both shoulders to the floor between the left and right side to
notice the precise onset where each shoulder begins to contribute
to a rolling movement the head). Here, the overall goal is that
students gain the ability to actively utilize the continuous, direct
and differentiated feedback generated in movement to sense
specific components of their own idiosyncratic way of acting,
training an attentional skill.
Finding and Refining Novel Procedures
Central to sensorimotor skill learning and mindful learning
is that the student directly evaluates and explores new ideas
or movement organizations (Held and Hein, 1963; Langer,
2000; Lotze et al., 2003; Berthouze and Goldfield, 2008; Iftime-
Nielsen et al., 2012). A repertoire of associations, procedures
and concepts is likely defined by the developmental genesis
of a sensorimotor repertoire that includes the coordination of
attention and goals (see, for example, Smith and Thelen, 2003;
Spencer et al., 2006; Barsalou et al., 2007). We hypothesize that
ATM scaffolds active reorganization of this repertoire along
with the development of novel movement components, including
movements of attention, via challenging ‘‘movement puzzles’’
which are difficult to ‘‘solve’’ based on habitual movement and
habitual skills alone. ATM movement puzzles provide hard
biomechanical constraints that can force attentive exploration
across a lesson. For instance, the lesson ‘‘Coordinating Flexor
and Extensor Muscles’’ instructs students to move their torso
to both sides while lying on the back with both feet standing,
raising both arms in front to the ceiling above the eyes,
palms touching as in clapping. In this position, the arms
form a triangle that limits moving the hands to one side via
the shoulder and thus encourages movement of the whole
torso (Feldenkrais, 1972). The student is thus encouraged to
intentionally explore automatic responses in comparison to
novel coordinations, generating awareness of what he is doing
habitually, of alternatives, and choice.
Importantly, mindful learning in both movement and
cognitive tasks is distinct from rote repetition or single
exposures, and it occurs naturally in learning conditions that
include uncertainty and variability (Langer, 2000). Catalogs of
Feldenkrais lessons include over 600 examples, each containing
many variations on a movement theme, so that a huge
variety of movements are explored with continuing practice
(Figure 2). These lessons may explore the same biomechanical
relationships (e.g., the role of the flexor and extensor muscles
in movements of the torso) in various positions (e.g., lying on
the floor, sitting, standing) or tasks (e.g., reaching, orienting
or walking). Once a functional relation can be differentiated
in sensation and action, the student practices flexibly applying
their novel coordination repertoire in new functional contexts
(i.e., new movement variations), thus ‘‘integrating’’ movement
components across procedures and perhaps facilitating transfer
to novel domains. Importantly, lessons may also explore the
application of higher-level features of movement, including the
coordination of attention and goals, which may be applicable
to more purely cognitive tasks (as discussed in the section
Coordinating Attention: Motoric Mind Wandering as a Context
For Practice). In particular, once novel alternatives are found,
Feldenkrais noted that students must invest conscious mental
effort at the level of continuing practice if they wish to transform
the novel movements into a novel habit, i.e., novel procedural
skills (Feldenkrais, 1972, 60).
The reduction of effort, however, aids the exploration of
novel alternatives. Feldenkrais proposed that movement under
heavy load self-stabilizes the activation of the concurrent motor
programs in an attempt to control strong forces of the movement
(Feldenkrais, 1972). Conversely, slow and small amplitude
movements may reduce the activation strength of existing motor
programs and thereby foster the ability to sense and explore novel
alternatives as well as to inhibit habitual components. In more
advanced stages, students are asked to attend particularly to the
initiation phase of the movement, for instance by asking what
the earliest point in time is when the beginning of a movement
pattern can be sensed—and potentially even motor initiation
in the imagination of movement can be sensed. Aiding the
emergence of novel patterns by reducing the activation strength
of current patterns is similar to the above resolution of the A-
not-B error (Thelen et al., 2001) in which changing the strength
of over-dominant motor programs can allow for contextually
integrated solutions to emerge. Similarly, this principle may
explain (in part) Langer’s (2000) observation that effortful
implementation of a pre-existing solution may hinder learning
of alternatives.
It is worth pointing out the central value of exploring
with variability and effort reduction over practice by repetition
within theories of motor learning. Bernstein noted that effective
sensorimotor training would combine reduced effort with a large
variability in the sensations (Bernstein, 1996), ideally leading to
‘‘dexterity’’ Bernstein’s term for the ability to apply motor skills
in novel situations. A breakdown in this ability to transfer even
very basic skills was observed in a sequence learning task on a
five-button keyboard, in which intermanual transfer is evident
after 1 h of practice, but little to no intermanual transfer is found
after 5 weeks of training (Karni et al., 1995). Thus, extended rote
practice may tie a skill to a particular mode of execution. The
absence of transfer suggests that participants failed to develop or
maintain more abstract levels of representation.
We propose that mindful learning may operate (in part)
by favoring abstract, transferrable procedures that include not
only motor plans, but also the coordination of attention and
goals. More recent approaches, for instance using reinforcement
learning, demonstrate that movement variability aids motor
learning by encouraging exploration (finding novel alternatives)
rather than exploitation (applying known procedures) of the
motor command space (Herzfeld and Shadmehr, 2014; Wu et al.,
2014). Task variation allows learners to observe and learn a
common structure in the co-variation of control parameters
between two tasks. Learning such general functional structures
rather than surface similarity yields a low-dimensional and task-
general control parameter space that is shared between tasks, and
hence facilitate transfer of skills to novel situations (Braun et al.,
2009), and we propose this computational principle is likely to
apply to the learning of attentional skills as well, in particular if
developed during action.
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Inhibition of Habitual Responses
A classically observed aspect important to mindfulness is the
ability of withholding or inhibiting the first salient response
(analogous to a stop signal task), thus providing the opportunity
to select more contextually appropriate perspective or response
to the present situation (Salomon and Globerson, 1987).
When enacting an overt movement, in contrast to observing
movements of thoughts, habitual movements are objectively
observable via the immediate sensorimotor consequences even
if the initial impulse is outside of awareness. Movement puzzles
in ATM render habitual movement salient for awareness and
open a window for inhibition. For instance, lifting one shoulder
when lying on the back often habitually tonifies one side of the
neck leading to a turning of the head in one direction, which
may interfere with the ability to move the head independently
from the shoulder. This habitual tendency can be detected
and inhibited in movement exploration. However, Feldenkrais
observed that becoming aware of the existence of a habit is likely
not sufficient to reliably inhibit a habit when it is triggered,
as some (or all) of the habitual process is likely pre-conscious
(perhaps more akin to a developmental rather than a skill
learning process). Thus, ATM lessons frequently instruct the
student to intentionally perform a movement that is normally
habitual in order to achieve some level of volitional control over
the habit. One of the simplest examples we are able to provide is
the lengthening of a habitually (or chronically) contractedmuscle
(we discuss lengthening the hamstring below, and provide a
Video 1 in the supplementary materials should the reader wish
to have a first- or third-person experience of such a lesson). As
above, the possibility of inhibiting a habitual movement may
become easier as one attends to earlier phases of movement
initiation. While performing a habit one whishes to reduce might
seem at first paradoxical, it is in line with the above models of
action goal selection in which inhibition and selection are flip
sides of the same mechanism (Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010), and ATM suggests that the level of
higher-level volitional control required to inhibit a habit may be
acquired by first learning to volitionally select the habit.
Coordinating Physical Movement: Inhibiting
Muscular Contraction
In this first of two example lessons for mindful movement,
we focus on a narrow outcome—the neural control of the
length of a muscle. This simple but important skill provides
a foundation for considering how more complex or abstract
skills might be practiced. Since muscular activity can only
produce contraction, the neural mechanism for lengthening
a muscle effectively comprises the inhibition of chronic or
habitual signals that dysfunctionally contract the muscle while
the opposing muscle contracts. Stephens et al. (2006) claim
to provide the first demonstration of increasing the range of
movement for lengthening a muscle (the hamstrings) without
stretching or other forms of strenuous physical exertion but
by providing sensorimotor information (i.e., experience) via
mindful movement exploration. The development of such a
skill may provide a foundation for other forms of behavioral
inhibition, and may be an important component of training
targeting ADHD impulsivity symptoms. In Stephens et al.’s
study, participants showed increased knee extension measured
in standardized conditions after engaging in ATM practice over
the course of 3 weeks (as noted above, a recording of one such
lesson is provided for demonstration in the Supplementary
Video 1). Given the lack of stretching or exertion during the
gentle movement of ATM practice it is unlikely that these
increases in range of motion were the result of tissue strain and
subsequent remodeling. Rather, they argue that the observed
increases in knee extensions were the result of novel coordination
patterns for the hamstring and related muscles. Consistent with
our theoretical model of skilled control, this could be explained
when mindful movement encourages the student to acquire
(and actively select) more functional alternatives in a process of
observing, and inhibiting movements and muscular effort that
result from habitual selection of co-occurring motor commands
that are not necessary or that even interfere with the execution
of the movement goal (Stephens et al., 2006).
Importantly, however, research published prior to the
Stephens et al. study failed to detect hamstring muscle
lengthening in groups that practiced ATM in comparison
to controls (James et al., 1998; Hopper et al., 1999). James et al.
(1998) suggested that this lack of an observed effect may have
been for a number of reasons. For example, there may have been
a problem with the ‘‘dosage’’ of ATM lessons directed toward
lengthening the hamstring muscles (e.g., duration of practice
or number of lessons). Yet more relevant to our theoretical
inquiry is the possibility that James et al.’s ATMs may not have
provided sufficient opportunity to build stable associations
and procedures. While ready transfer of abstract structures is
observed between effectors (Keele et al., 1995; Braun et al., 2009),
this has been (to our knowledge) uniformly observed in tasks
where subjects immediately know how to perform the initial
task. Skill learning is then observed via increases in accuracy,
speed, or automaticity. James et al. may have been operating
under the assumption that any ATM should yield abstract,
transferrable skill to lengthen any of one’s muscles—their
intervention included 4 ATM lessons, but only 1 lesson was
directed toward lengthening hamstring muscles. In the case
of lengthening the hamstring, however, the student must gain
a novel ability to inhibit a habitually contracted muscle. As
such, a period of motor ‘‘concept formation’’ (perhaps more
akin to motor ‘‘development’’ than ‘‘learning’’) may need to
precede the ‘‘conceptual’’ level, in which the student focuses
on specific sensorimotor details until coherent patterns are
learned. Such constraints may apply to learning novel executive
or attentional ‘‘concepts’’ (e.g., structural procedures) as
well—sustained practice may likewise be required on a specific
focus before abstract, transferrable attentional or executive skills
are developed.
Certainly, we should exercise extreme caution in drawing
theoretical conclusions from a handful of studies, but these
findings provide examples of how we might rigorously evaluate
the specificity of newly learned skills in the context of mindful
movement training. By providing a set of lessons that explore,
say, enhanced quality of movement in general vs. a targeted set of
lessons with a precisely specified outcome (such as lengthening
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 15 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 297
Clark et al. Skilled attention
FIGURE 3 | (A) and (B) Frames from Awareness Through Movement (ATM)
supplementary videos 2 and 3 demonstrating “motoric mind wandering.” (A)
Introducing the dual task. An excerpt from Haller (2014), vol. 2, disc 3. The
student learns to perform a rhythmic movement of the hand while doing
another movement (see Supplementary Video 2). (B) Increased challenge.
The student struggles to remain engaged with the rhythmic movement of her
hand while doing another challenging movement. The overall goal is to learn to
coordinate control and attention to perform both movements simultaneously
(see Supplementary Video 3). (C) Frame from supplementary video 4
demonstrating effects of ATM. A group of Seattle 18 fireman volunteers took
part in a one week pilot program of Body Awareness Training based upon the
teachings of Moshe Feldenkrais. Video data was collected before and after the
training to establish quantitative measures of improvement. The man in the
video was a supervisor and not as exposed to physical demands. But,
changes are evident (see Supplementary Video 4). Provided with permission
of Jeff Haller.
the hamstring), we may be able to demonstrate the focus
necessary to efficiently and reliably learn the building blocks of
novel skills. Having established specific skill gains, we might
further explore if mindful practice yields the ability to transfer
learned structures to novel movement contexts, or even to more
abstract skills.
BOX 1 | Objective improvements.
Martial artists (including Feldenkrais) employ similar strategies, for example in
“moving while sensing tanden,” in which participants are instructed attend
to their lower abdomen—the tanden—while performing various movements.
The movements are distracting; the whole lesson is about learning to regain
attention of the tanden. An even more universal instruction is to maintain focus
on the breath (notably including FA meditation). In tai chi, there are universally
applied principles like groundedness and stepping with an empty leg (Wayne
and Kaptchuk, 2008a; Wayne, 2013). In Yoga, there are aspects of the breath
that are monitored and controlled (Gard et al., 2014a). In ATM, there are
likewise general concepts such as reversibility of movement, connectedness
to the support surface, sensitivity to habitual motor impulses, reduction of
unnecessary muscular effort that are intended to be a part of every movement
performed (Feldenkrais, 1972). The advantage of an overt hand movement
(as in the “motoric mind wandering” example) is that outside observers can
also (categorically) detect when the student “wanders” (readers may verify
this for themselves with the videos in the supplementary material). Novel
movement instructions, particularly those that provide attentional challenges
may additionally yield an initial feeling of awkwardness when doing a “lesson”,
which may gradually reduce as the student improves. Feldenkrais speaks
of ultimately becoming “elegant” in one’s movements, which may provide
additional externally observable criteria for indexing gradual improvements
during learning.
Coordinating Attention: Motoric Mind Wandering
as a Context for Practice
Above we also discussed a more high-level form of sensation
and information—the detection of mind wandering—as the first
step of FA meditation practice. While a common practice of
FA meditation is the more ‘‘cognitive’’ maintenance of single-
pointed attention, in a second example lesson we illustrate
higher-order goal-maintenance as an aspect of movement
practices. A motoric analog of FA is for example provided
in the ‘‘flex hand to stand’’ ATM (recordings are provided
in the Figures 3A,B and the Supplementary Video 2 and
Supplementary Video 3). This lesson aims to provide a motoric
context for detecting failures of task-relevant goal maintenance.
The student is instructed to rhythmically perform precise
configural movements with the fingers of one hand (a motor
paradigm that is known to strongly engage dorsal premotor
cortex; Verstynen et al., 2005) and in addition perform a second
motor task—rolling with the torso to one side. The overarching
goal is for the student to perform both tasks simultaneously.
However, when attention becomes too absorbed in the details
of rolling, the movement of the hand stops (or becomes tense
or stiff), in essence creating an observable moment of ‘‘motoric
mind wandering’’ (including changes in overall movement
quality ormotor tonus). The student thus finds himself in a whole
body sensorimotor situation designed for the practice of goal-
maintenance in a context of overtly observable mind wandering
(or ‘‘motor-wandering’’).
While the above ATM lesson may provide a particularly
clear analog for the ‘‘cognitive’’ practice of FA meditation,
the general strategy of embedding continuous monitoring and
maintenance of global aspects within a set of local movements
is shared with other practices like tai chi and yoga (see
Box 1). Continuous monitoring and maintenance of higher-level
qualities of movement may provide an embodied and engaging
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context to practice cognitive skills, and we propose that this
is likely central to potential cognitive improvements observed
from such practices. As with the lesson above on ‘‘lengthening
the hamstring, it may be that sustained practice on a well-
defined ‘‘mind wandering’’ challenge may be more effective than
highly varied practice. In tai chi, for example, one could imagine
providing beginning students with a consistent attentional focus
for the first few weeks of practice, only switching after students
were able to create the building blocks of a novel attentional
skill.
Conclusion
We have evaluated the potential of mindful movement practices
to improve the control of attention, both in typical and
in pathological cases. Cognitive, neural, and developmental
perspectives point to a shared capacity for inhibition and
selection that spans basic motor processes and higher-order
cognitive control. At the neural level, we have highlighted
the role of frontal regions that are arranged in a hierarchy
from primary motor, to premotor, on to prefrontal cortices
in supporting the formation, selection and execution of
procedures that coordinate action over time and space, in concert
with parietal and subcortical regions (Fuster, 2001). Given a
reciprocal contribution of motor processes to executive control
and of executive control to (higher-level) motor processes,
a practice based on movement may provide an integrated
opportunity to improve the control of attention—in movement
and otherwise.
Based on evidence for a functional contribution of
the (higher-level) motor system to executive processes of
attention and cognitive control across pathological and typical
populations, we suggest modeling the deployment of attention as
a motor skill process. Ourmodel of skillful attention hypothesizes
a possible mechanism for attentional and executive control in
procedural skills that organize reciprocal inhibition and selection
of candidate goals and actions within shared executive processes
between movement, attention and cognition. As with other
skills, our model predicts that executive control of attention
can be improved by obtaining a robust coordination of goals,
attention, and action. In classical skill learning, the accumulation
of a conceptual or ‘‘declarative’’ knowledge base is critical
to this process, though we suggest that the accumulation
of novel functional procedures will ultimately dominate
fluent performance in later stages of skill learning. Neural
changes would likely include initial enhancement of prefrontal
activity that decreases as procedures become established as
sensorimotor procedures via a process for instance of hebbian
or reinforcement learning. Following the skill literature, robust
goal-directed action is obtained when the continued practice of
initial ‘‘cognitive’’ strategies builds up a repertoire of procedural
associations between attended sensations, goals, and actions.
We highlight a mindful mode of learning skills (Salomon and
Globerson, 1987; Langer, 2000) via movement (Feldenkrais,
1981) based less on effort but more on fostering sensitivity
to variation and active exploration. In contrast to effortful
repetition to strengthen a single given way of acting, mindful
learning enhances the repertoire of alternative procedures
available to achieve a given goal. We propose that a more
effortless mindful mode of learning may yield a more abstract
structure of the procedures that are learned. As stated above,
how one learns is as important as what one learns. Further, if
the practice is interesting and engaging, even initial practice
may be driven more by interest in mastery of the practice than
by endogenous effort towards a goal (Leonard, 1992; Langer,
2000). Thus, notwithstanding improvements of cognitive control
via effortful focusing of attention, we suggest investigating an
alternative approach in which robust structural procedures
for guiding attention are acquired via mindful practice of an
engaging movement-oriented skill.
A movement practice moreover provides the opportunity to
train procedures for inhibition and selection in the context of
the natural sensorimotor loop, in which physical actions generate
concretely observable sensory consequences. In particular, while
it is difficult to sense the status of goals, intentions, or thoughts,
movement provides concrete, readily observable phenomena that
will proceed from an enacted motor plan. Mindful comparison
between expected and observed outcomes may provide clear
signals for error-driven learning processes (as supported by
predictive processes of movement control in prefrontal cortex
and the cerebellum). We suggest this entrainment of the
sensorimotor loop is a strong argument to examine the
domain of motor practice: the practitioner has the scaffold of
a physical, sensory context as they grapple with attentional
control, and likewise, as researchers, the results of successfully
selected (or unsuccessfully inhibited)movements result in readily
measurable outcomes (i.e., overt movements, EMG). The motor
system additionally provides an opportunity to probe for cortical
inhibition via TMS SICI (discussed in the section A Motor
Perspective on Attention and Self-Regulation), and may provide
a further opportunity for distinguishing between the effects of
motorically grounded practice and more ‘‘cognitive’’ practices.
The variety of potential movement trainings may also provide
for specificity with improved behavioral inhibition resulting
from a practice of inhibiting habitual muscular efforts, and
attentiveness being improved via lessons that challenge the
coordination of attention (as in the motoric mind wandering
lesson above).
Challenges to a Motor Skill Theory of Attention
While we claim that our expansion of motor skills to include
cognitive control has already been productive, it is by no means
definitive. We note that skill is not a monolithic concept, and we
might be accused of mapping one complex system onto another
arbitrary complex system. To guard against this, it is necessary
to clearly specify a computational model for a given set of tasks,
along with expected biologic correlates. The challenge remains
to find an appropriate balance between a holistic account on
one hand, and a sufficiently specific and falsifiable account on
the other. In particular, we have argued that ‘‘structural’’ (i.e.,
abstract, transferrable) procedures are critical to our proposed
mechanism for cognitive and attentional effects of mindful
movement training. While the nature of transferrable motor
procedures dates back to the early days of skill research (i.e.,
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Fitts and Posner, 1967; MacKay, 1982; Bernstein, 1996), it
remains an open and novel research question to develop
clear computational and neural models of abstract procedures
of attention. In particular, a plausible alternative to our
procedure account is a capacity account, in which prefrontal and
premotor networks implicated in motor and attentional control
are generically ‘‘strengthened’’ with practice. Without clear
specification and approaches to measuring abstract attentional
procedures, it is difficult to distinguish a capacity from a skill
(or procedural) account. This highlights the central role of
improving our characterization of attentional and other abstract
cognitive procedures in order to progress with our theory.
Fortunately, experimental cognitive science has already provided
a number of paradigms for assessing attentional and cognitive
control, and performance on these paradigms is not perfectly
correlated (cf. Kipp, 2005), and thus may already provide a way
to index different abstract procedures.
Our skill framework may also not apply to all approaches
to mindfulness. For example, FA may rely less on a skill
base of procedures, and more on a conceptual or ‘‘declarative’’
knowledge base. Elsewhere in this issue, Russell and Arcuri
(2015) argue for the centrality of mindfulness that is closer
to FA meditation than our conception of mindful learning
for effective clinical movement training (they term their
approach ‘‘contemplative movement’’ in contrast with ‘‘mindful
movement’’ like tai chi, yoga, or Feldenkrais). While enhanced
control of somatosensory attention is seen in ‘‘standard’’
meditation approaches (Kerr et al., 2013), this may reflect a
focus on bodily sensation during meditation training that is
not shared among all traditions. As opposed to a focus on
sensation processes, some teachers of insight approaches may
suggest distancing one’s self from discomfort while sitting still,
and other paths may direct students to abstract affective foci
such as ‘‘loving kindness’’ or compassion. These profound
differences in the deployment of attention between forms of
mindfulness training likely do different things, and have different
neural bases. To understand them, we must differentiate their
mechanisms—or within our framework, identify foundational
procedures and knowledge. Both traditional and contemporary
mindful movement practices are complex multi-component
interventions in comparison to laboratory paradigms (Wayne
and Kaptchuk, 2008a). In particular, we have only mentioned
the possible role of reward and motivation for skill learning,
even though motivation is highlighted by Feldenkrais (1981)
and Langer (2000), and has also been a recent focus of
interest in formal models of skill learning (e.g., Oudeyer
et al., 2007; Metzen and Kirchner, 2013; Santucci et al.,
2013), reward-based neuronal decision making (e.g., Gottfried
et al., 2003; Daw et al., 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006),
and—particularly relevant for our approach—in relation to
effort (Kurniawan et al., 2010) vs. novelty (Wittmann et al.,
2007).
Crucially, we also have not attempted to provide a complete
overview of the Feldenkrais method—let alone the full breadth
of mindful movement practices—and these other aspects
may be critical to gain the full value of the practice. For
instance, we have only hinted at the detailed exploration of
biomechanical configurations offered in ATM. Likewise, we
have only started to delve into Feldenkrais’ deep philosophical
commitment to a movement basis for the development of our
minds, which beyond shared resources of movement, sensation
and cognition also includes emotions (Feldenkrais, 1972, 32).
More critically, we have not described Feldenkrais’ assumed
model of optimal organization, including the use of skeletal
as opposed to muscular support in gravity, or structuring the
movement system so it allows immediate initiation of a novel
movement plan with minimal hesitation and preparation. For
an accessible, practical introduction, see Feldenkrais (1972), or
for a more theoretical treatment, see Feldenkrais (1981). For
a more complete overview of yoga, see Gard et al. (2014a)
and for tai chi, Wayne and Kaptchuk (2008a,b). Perhaps most
critically, much work remains to establish whether mindful
movement approaches are reliable and efficacious (though we
have mentioned similar concerns regarding standard treatments
for ADHD in section A Motor Perspective on Attention and
Self-Regulation). While we have provided multiple lines of
evidence for our selected aspect of improving cognitive control
and attention via mindful movement, we can only definitively
claim that we have identified promising opportunities for
investigation.
A Motor Skill Orientation to Training Attention
Strong support for our motor skill framework comes from
the co-occurrence (and correlation) of motor and cognitive
difficulties in abnormal development (Diamond, 2000), and in
particular in the case of ADHD (Mostofsky and Simmonds,
2008). We provide an explanatory scheme that foundationally
incorporates the co-occurring motor/cognitive disorder. Our
model of skilled attention is based in a well-understood link
between motor system and cognition via shared processes
of inhibition/selection that are supported by a hierarchy of
frontal regions (embedded within a larger network). This link
provides behavioral and neural motormeasures that complement
measures such as go/no-go and stop signal tasks, and are
particularly relevant for relating sensorimotor improvements to
more cognitive improvements in a movement practice. Given
the lack of long-lasting interventions for ADHD (and other
disorders), and the theoretical basis we have presented, there
is the potential that our proposal may isolate core features of
developmental challenges (rather than symptoms), which may
have tremendous benefit. In particular, two of the authors are
currently exploring the impact of a mindful movement training
on TMS SICI in ADHD. This approach provides the rare ability
to assess changes in causal neural mechanisms of low-level motor
inhibition.
A large body of research demonstrates that a putative basis of
improved mental abilities, neural plasticity, is driven by activity
dependent learning mechanisms. Their main characteristic is
that the neuronal hardware adapts in functionally specific
ways to the particular experience of the organism (for
reviews of a broad range of neuronal plasticity results,
see e.g., Kaas, 1991; Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998;
Simoncelli and Olshausen, 2001; Sur and Leamey, 2001; Pascual-
Leone et al., 2005). As a computational consequence, a
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central question for training-based improvements of neuronal
functioning is the ability to drive the desired neural activity,
and hence, plasticity. If, as we suggest, movement and
cognitive control consist of procedures for selection and
inhibition across sensorimotor and goal representations, mindful
movement training demonstrates a profound potential to
improve cognitive function and attention in ADHD and the
general population. Experimentally, we would expect the content
of the skill (e.g., improvements in trained movements) to
increase alongside changes in motor system measures such
as mirror overflow or TMS SICI as well as measures of
attention and executive control. Our first feasibility trial is
currently underway to determine whether we can detect clear
relationships between ‘‘cognitive’’ clinical improvements and
measures of motoric function in the administration of mindful
movement to adolescents with ADHD. Experimenters and
clinicians can test our theory by measuring (and reporting!)
improvements in movement skill (e.g., in addition to clinical
targets) as we seek to understand the basis for improved
attentional and cognitive control from mindful movement
interventions.
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Supplementary Materials
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found on
figshare. Links are provided below:
Supplementary Video 1 | Lengthening the Hamstrings Awareness
Through Movement (ATM) Lesson. An excerpt from chapter 2 of Haller
(2014), vol. 9, disc 1. The full movement lesson is included, followed by the
initial class discussion. The lesson may be used to provide a first-person
experience, or for third-person observation of students doing the lesson.
Provided with permission by Jeff Haller. Supplementary Video 1 is available
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1448106
S V 2 and 3 | Awareness Through Movement
(ATM) demonstrating “motoric mind wandering”. An excerpt from Haller
(2014), vol. 2, disc 3.
Supplementary Video 2 | Introducing the dual task. The student learns to
perform a rhythmic movement of the hand while doing another movement.
Supplementary Video 2 is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1447886
Supplementary Video 3 | Increased challenge. The student struggles to
remain engaged with the rhythmic movement of her hand while doing another
challenging movement. The overall goal is to learn to coordinate control and
attention to perform both movements simultaneously. Provided with
permission by Jeff Haller. Supplementary Video 3 is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1447842
Supplementary Video 4 | Effects of ATM. A group of Seattle 18 fireman
volunteers took part in a one week pilot program of Body Awareness Training
based upon the teachings of Moshe Feldenkrais. Video data was collected
before and after the training to establish quantitative measures of
improvement. The man in the video was a supervisor and not as exposed to
physical demands. But, changes are evident. Provided with permission by Jeff
Haller. Supplementary Video 4 is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1453157
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